Edward Luttwak was one of the great Cold War strategists. His book, Strategy, is still a classic of multi-layed military thinking and analysis. But his strategies revolved around fighting, and since the whole point of the Cold War was to not fight, his strategies were therefore not designed to win. They were designed to deter, to allow the professionals to manage. Ironic, then, that one of the great military strategists was more or less blindsided by Reagan's philosophy of victory, and economic strategy to that end.
"Managing the conflict" is exactly what's gotten Israel into the state that it's in now, giving away land for the promise not to be killed. Well, not today, anyway. And Luttwak, once again, is fighitng the last non-war. In today's Wall Street Journal, Luttwak invites Syria back into Lebanon, this time to tame its own client-militia (Come Back, Bashar).
Then there is the horrible-to-contemplate but irresistibly seductive diplomatic option: to invite the Syrians to disarm Hezbollah and persuade it to follow the political path. Hezbollah already has two ministers in the Lebanese cabinet and might claim more.Naturally that would imply the recognition of Syrian suzerainty over Lebanon, and of course the thoroughly unworthy Bashar Assad would have to be treated as a leader of regional importance. Only that could tempt Mr. Assad to abandon his alliance with Iran -- along with the important rewards that would come his way more or less spontaneously. These rewards would include gifts from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, all three of which now fear Iran as the most dangerous threat they face; they would also include the approval -- or at least the diminished hostility -- of Syria's Sunni majority, which vehemently dislikes the alliance with Shiite Iran, especially now that the Iranians are supporting Iraq's Shiites in their bloody fight with the Sunnis.
Back to the same game with the same faces, balancing one against the other, and then multiples against the one. Spending time and energy and treasure to stay in the same place. A perfect, realpolitik solution where nothing changes and the diplomats can manage the crises as they arise.
Or, we can disarm Hezbollah ourselves, permit the Lebanese to give democracy a try, relieve the pressure on Israel's north. Perhaps - perhaps - the Syrian generals will ditch Assad and the Iranians, realizing that alliance is a dead end, and then they can come to us on our terms, rather than our trying yet again to go to an Assad on his. At which point, with Iran isolated, we can look for an endgame there as well.
Now tell me, which one do you want to see? Of course you do. Because this time, there is a difference among the Arab players. This time, it's not one faceless dictator against another, but a democracy (Israel) defending itself, and helping to give another (Lebanon's) enough breathing room to make a go of it.
Luttwak's is a little game for little men, and if it's what the Arabs choose for themselves again, we have to let them play it out. Unfortunately, Islamofascism has bigger dreams, and the only way to counter them in the long run is to offer big dreams of your own. It's that component of strategy Luttwak has never seemed to grasp.
