Rich Lowry quotes Tom Friedman as claiming that Hezbollah's war is killing prospects for Arab democracy:
First, Nasrallah has set back the whole fledgling Arab democracy movement. That movement, by the way, was being used by Islamist parties — like Hezbollah and Hamas — to peacefully ascend to power. Hezbollah, for the first time, had two ministers in the Lebanese cabinet. Hamas, through a U.S.-sponsored election, took over the Palestinian Authority. And in both cases, as well as in Iraq, these Islamist parties were allowed to sit in government and maintain their own militias outside.What both Hamas and Nasrallah have done — by dragging their nations into unnecessary wars with Israel — is to prove that Islamists will not be made more accountable by political power. Just the opposite; not only will they not fix the potholes, they will start wars, whenever they choose, that will lead to even bigger potholes.
Does this mean Hamas and Hezbollah will never get another vote? Of course not. Their followers will always follow. What it does mean is that if the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, or Islamists in Jordan or the gulf, had any hopes of taking power through electoral means, they can forget about it. I don't see their governments ever allowing elections that might bring Islamist parties to power, and I don't see the U.S. promoting any more elections in the region, for now. The Arab democracy experiment is on hold — because if Islamist parties can't be trusted to rule, elections can't be trusted to be held.
Huh?
Friedman seems to assume that once a Hamas voter (or a Muslim Brotherhood voter, or a Hezbollah voter), always so. That a Hamas voter is a Hamas follower. Hasn’t it been accepted (esp. by Friedman himself) that “moderates,” or at least, non-Islamists, have voted for or supported these parties for other reasons, fully expecting them to be domesticated by power. Why wouldn’t these independents then abandon these parties once they see that isn’t happening? And wouldn’t that make Arab elections less risky? (This argues, of course, for holding voters responsible for their choices, not insulating them from those consequences.)
Electoral politics aside, Israel’s goal seems to be to eliminate Hezbollah as an effective fighting force, and permit the Lebanese government – now Democratic – to toss them out of the Cabinet and for the Lebanese army to reassert its authority in the south.
In short, why does this do more damage to Lebanon’s democracy than to Hezbollah?