There's not a better popular history of the run-up to the Civil War than Bruce Catton's The Coming Fury.
In it, he describes the considerable pro-Union sentiment that existed in the South, even as its political leaders, having engineered secession, prepared to defend it via the Confederacy. The North, including Lincoln, continued to delude itself that these pro-Union Southerners wouldn't let it come to blows. But when it came to blows, even Unionists in Virginia and North Carolina, states that hadn't formally seceded yet, sided with the secessionists.
One of the arguments against attacking Iran is the presence of considerable pro-Western, pro-Democracy, pro-American sentiment. The fear is that war would alienate these people, and that fear may well be correct.
But in order to justify doing nothing, that fear has to be coupled with the hope that those people will organize and defeat the mullahs.
During the election, and indeed, until his inauguration, Lincoln made the mistake of not talking about slavery, on the grounds that whatever he said would be twisted by malicious editors. (Hmmm.) But they simply repeated their claims that he would immediately push for universal emancipations, demoralizing Unionists and animating secessionists.
This administration has seemingly been unwilling to aid the Iranian opposition for fear of making them look like tools of the United States. This has had the effect of demoralizing them, animating the mullahs, and hasn't stopped the mullahs from waging war on their own population to stay in power, anyway.
Look, I take second place to nobody in my desire to see the mullahs doing a collective Mussolini impersonation in the public square. But it's not going to happen on its own.
